Finance and Growth: The Role of Islamic Contracts by Ismail, Abdul Ghafar & Tohirin, Achmad
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Finance and Growth: The Role of
Islamic Contracts
Abdul Ghafar Ismail and Achmad Tohirin
Centre for Research in Islamic Economics and Finance School of
Economics, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Centre for Islamic
Economics Development and Studies (P3EI) Faculty of Economics,
Islamic University of Indonesia
February 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13744/
MPRA Paper No. 13744, posted 3. March 2009 23:49 UTC
 
 
1 
 
Finance and Growth: The Role of Islamic Contracts 
 
 
Achmad Tohirin
1
 
Centre for Islamic Economics Development and Studies (P3EI) 
Faculty of Economics, Islamic University of Indonesia 
Condong Catur, Depok, Sleman,Yogyakarta, 55283,  
Indonesia 
Telp. +62 274 881 546 
Fax.  +62 274 882 589 
E-mail: achmad@fe.uii.ac.id 
 
and 
 
Abdul Ghafar b. Ismail
2
 
Centre for Research in Islamic Economics and Finance 
School of Economics, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 
Bangi, 43600 Selangor D.E. 
Malaysia 
Tel: +603-8921 5760 
Fax: +603-8921 5789 
E-mail: agibab@ukm.my 
 
 
This Draft February 2009 
 
 
Paper submitted to  
 
International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Lecturer of Islamic economics, Islamic University of Indonesia, Yogyakarta 
2
 Professor of banking and financial economics, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. We are benefited from 
research grant funded by Ministry of Higher Education, under Fundamental Research Grant Scheme no UKM-
EP-04-FRGS0001-2006 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
Although, Islamic law has been in existence for more than fourteen hundred years, but its 
implementation have been subjected to the willingness of the rulers in the passage of history 
and civilization. Although, the study on financial contracts has been extensively reviewed, 
the role of Islamic contracts is not highlighted, except those in the historical institutional and 
contract theory literatures. The study that link finance and growth takes many dimensions. 
One of the dimensions is law and finance view. In the beginning, the studies that link the 
former only look at the finance variables and economic variables. Further development 
analyses the relationship at the system level, i.e. discussion whether bank-based vs. market-
based matters on growth. Islamic finance comes up with its distinctive contracts and products 
of profit-loss sharing. It may give different character and notion in the financial system in 
particular and in the economic system in general. This paper is aimed at discussing Islamic 
laws which are relevant to finance. Most importantly the aspect of contracts as foundation for 
the distinctive Islamic financial products, i.e. the one resembling profit-loss sharing nature 
containing cooperative spirit, will be analysed to establish a strong connection with financial 
stability as pre-requisite to achieve the economic growth. 
 
JEL Classification: G2; K2; K4;  
Keyword: Islamic law; finance; profit-loss sharing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Law and finance, as argued is a set of contracts.  These contracts are defined – and made 
more or less effective – by legal rights and enforcement mechanisms.  From this perspective, 
a well-functioning legal system facilitates the operation of both markets and intermediaries. 
The operation would overall affect the level and quality of financial services – which finally 
improve the efficient allocation of resources and economic growth. 
This has motivated Levine et al. (2000) and Beck and Levine (2002) to examine the 
different legal and accounting standards among country and their effects to financial 
intermediaries‟ development.3  By categorizing countries into four legal families; French, 
English, German and Scandinavian (descended from Roman law), Levine et al. (2000) use 
the differences in the legal origin that cover the legal rules on secured creditors, the efficiency 
of contract enforcement and the quality of the accounting standards and find that the financial 
intermediaries‟ developments are connected to the legal and regulatory characteristics 
defining intermediary‟s activities. 
Then, Beck and Levine (2002) do some experiments on the judicial efficiency by 
assessing the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment, produced by the country-risk 
rating agency Business International Corporation. The rating is average over 1980-83 and 
ranges from one to ten, with higher numbers indicating higher level of judicial efficiency. 
The correlations indicate that judicial efficiency is positively correlated with finance-
aggregate and structure-aggregate
4
 and negatively correlated with state ownership. The 
finding indicates that countries with more efficient legal systems experience higher level of 
financial development and are more market based system but are less state ownership bank.
5
 
Although, Islamic law has been in existence for more than fourteen hundred years, but 
its implementation have been subjected to the willingness of the rulers in the passage of 
history and civilization. Although, the study on financial contracts has been extensively 
reviewed, the role of Islamic contracts is not highlighted, except those in the historical 
institutional and contract theory literatures. For instance, a few of them such as paper done by 
Gonzales de-Lara (2001) which discusses risk-sharing in financial contracts with focus on the 
sea-loan (debt-based) contract and commenda (equity-based or mudharaba) contract. 
Whereas The Mejelle Ahkame Adliye
6
 was elaborated between 1869 and 1876 as a part of the 
Legislative purpose of the Tanzimat, initiated in imperial Turkey, with the approval of Sultan 
(Rahman, S.A, 1967), has been in the market since the late of nineteenth century but not 
implemented due to colonial era which forced the colonialized countries to follow their laws, 
e.g. common law in Malaysia and Dutch law in Indonesia. 
 
                                                          
3
 The intermediaries development were measured  on the followings: Restrict (regulations restricting banks from 
engaging in securities market activities, insurance, real estate transactions and  owning non-financial firm), State 
Ownership, Finance-aggregate, Judiciary efficiency and Industry elasticity.  See, Beck and Levine (2002) pp. 
162-163 for the result of the analysis. 
4
 Finance aggregate is the first principal component of finance-activity [log (total value on the private sector as 
share of GDP)]: focuses on government ownership of banks and structure aggregate provides a measure of the 
comparative role of banks and markets in the economy. 
5
 As shown by La Porta et al. (1998) which examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders 
and creditors, the origin of these rules and the quality of their enforcement.  The result shows that common-law 
countries generally have the strongest, French civil-law countries is the weakest, legal protections of investors, 
and German-and Scandinavian located in the middle. 
6
 The Penal Code of 1850 and the Commercial Code of 1861 were the predecessors of the Mejelle but these two 
compilations had been largely based on the laws of European countries. The Mejelle represents an attempt to 
codify that part of Hanafi fiqh which treats of muamalat (transactions between people). The codification was the 
work of a Commission of Jurists, headed by Ahmad Djevdet Pasha, the Minister of Justice (Rahman, S.A, 
1967). 
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Since, Islamic teachings covers all dimensions of human life includes guiding the 
relations among people as individual and as a communal in various aspects such as economic, 
social, cultural and political. Accordingly Muslim individual cannot compartmentalise his/her 
behaviour into religious and secular dimensions as he/she is always asked to be bound by 
shari’a. Islamic law thus embodies an encompassing set of duties and practices including 
worship, prayer, manners and morals, marriage, inheritance, crime and commercial 
transactions: that is, it embraces many aspects that would not necessarily be considered as 
law elsewhere (Lewis and Alagoud, 2001: 16). Based on this fact therefore Islamic teachings 
on transactions may have a strong distinctive character in the economy provided that they are 
implemented properly taken into account all necessary spirit, rules, regulations, and 
institutions.  
The fact that under Islamic law on transactions there are various types of contracts, 
from contract of sales and purchases, contract of usufructs such as leasing, contract of 
sharecropping, partnerships and equity participation, and Islamic banking establishments, 
emerged significantly in the last three decades, are permitted to adopt all these contract types, 
then it is logical to classify Islamic banks into a universal banking institutions. 
The objective of this paper is to discuss Islamic laws which are relevant to finance. 
Most importantly the aspect of contracts as foundation for the distinctive Islamic financial 
products, i.e. the one resembling profit-loss sharing nature which contains cooperative spirit, 
will be analysed to establish a strong connection with financial stability as pre-requisite to 
achieve the economic growth. It is believed in this paper that embarking from cooperative 
spirit, through developing equity partnership instruments in the financial system, will be able 
to create a more sound value added in the economy, so that higher economic growth and 
more equitable distribution of resources can be achieved simultaneously. 
The remaining discussion of this paper will be divided into 4 sections. Section 2 
contains prior studies in the area of finance and growth. Section 3 exposes Islamic law 
covering origin and financial contracts. Further discussion on legal right and protection under 
Islamic finance is contained in Section 4 which includes right and protection, mechanism of 
corporate governance, Shari’a Advisory Council.  
 
 
2. Prior Studies 
 
The study that link finance and growth takes many dimensions. One of the dimensions is law 
and finance view. In the beginning, the studies that link the former only look at the finance 
variables and economic variables. It can be seen from the following studies.  King and Levine 
(1993a, 1993b) use cross-country regressions to show that the level of intermediation at the 
start of the period is positively related to the rate of economic growth during the period. King 
and Levine‟s work is part of a rapidly developing literature on intermediation and growth 
which includes Saint-Paul (1992), Pagano (1993), Cetorelli (1997), Levine and Zervos 
(1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Cetorelli and Gambera (1999), among others. 
Later researchers have expanded further to look at the role of balance sheet of both 
banks and firms. Both are known as bank‟s balance sheet view and firm‟ balance sheet view, 
respectively. From the former view, authors like Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995), propose that, under tightened monetary policy, banks adjust their stock of 
loans by reducing the maturity of loan originations and reallocate short-term loan supply 
from small firms to large firms. This reallocation is known as „flight to quality‟. They show 
that bank lending channel works through changes in loan maturity and balance sheet channel 
works through reallocation of short-term loan supply. We interpret this as evidence 
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supporting existence of a bank lending channel since one of the links in the chain of causality 
behind the bank lending channel is that after a monetary contraction, bank lend less. 
However, the firm‟s balance sheet view is against the bank‟s balance sheet view. They 
argue, as originally proposed by Robinson (1952) that “where firm leads finance follows” is 
frequently quoted. In other words, as quoted by Koetter and Wedow (2006), financial 
services are provided as a reaction to the demand by corporate firms, that is finance follows 
entrepreneurial activity. The statement is explicit in claiming that financial development takes 
place endogeneously in meeting the demand of expanding real economy. Support for 
Robinson‟s view could be found in the works of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and more 
recently in the works of Claessens, S. and Laeven, L. (2003). 
Furthermore, Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1995) provide an argument on the 
connection between the firm‟s balance sheet and business cycle, which is partly due to the 
movement of capital stock component.
7
 They predict an accelerator effect of financial 
fragility on investment, for instance a negative shock to productivity today decreases the 
current income of the entrepreneur, then it causes future agency costs to increase and hence 
future investment and production depress. Empirical evidences on the relevance of firm‟s 
balance sheet, as reported in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), indicates that investment is 
sensitive to financial factors. This especially so,  during a downturn, where in this respect 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) argue that the proportion of credit advanced to the borrowing 
firms with low agency costs increases. This phenomena is known as flight to quality  
Therefore, both views come up two propositions, i.e., “finance leads investment” and 
“firm leads finance”.  However, the former proposition leads us to expand our view to the 
role of capital market. The role can be seen clearly in Beck et.al, (2000a). They argue that, 
less-dependent bank, due to, for instance, expensive cost to extract firm information might 
cause firms to face higher charge from bank and hence might reduce firms‟ incentive to take 
more profitable projects (with higher risk level). The proponent of this view also indicates the 
weaknesses of bank‟s balance sheet view in that banking system might impede innovation 
and growth. Therefore, the proponent of firm‟s balance sheet view is aimed at: reducing 
inefficiencies connected with bank‟s balance sheet view and facilitating new firms creation 
and hence the investment to grow. 
More important than that whether the legal system could provide good enforcement and 
protection to investors. Hence, the impact will be on the greater financial development. The 
following studies would give the answer. 
Gonzales de-Lara (2000?) advances that in Late-medieval Venice institutional 
arrangements that enhanced the State‟s ability to verify information expanded the set of 
contracts that the Venetian State could enforce and enabled the transition from the sea loan (a 
debt-like contract) to the commenda (an equity-like contract). This implied a better allocation 
of risk and, arguably, further mobilization of capital. The paper also shows that the sea loan 
and the commenda contracts sustained the optimal allocation of risk given their underlying 
institutional foundations. Moreover, the enhanced State‟s ability to verify information 
supported the first-best allocation of risk, which was attained by letting the merchant finance 
part of the venture and raising additional funds through commenda contracts. Thus, the paper 
provides a rationale for the efficiency and observed co-existence of debt and equity, as well 
as for the participation of merchants-entrepreneurs to the funding of their own ventures 
(inside equity). 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that countries with legal 
environments characterized by “good” investor protection laws have larger and broader 
capital markets, and thus firms in these countries have more access to external finance. For 
                                                          
7
 Florio (2006) provides a good survey on this connection. 
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example, they calculate that the ratio of stock market capitalization (adjusted for insider 
ownership) to GNP is 60 percent for English common law countries versus only 21 percent 
for French civil law countries. Our research is related to theirs because the legal systems in 
the transitional economies have been identified as a significant barrier to the development of 
more advanced systems of financial intermediation. 
Along the same lines, Durnev and Kim (2005) use firm-level data from 27 countries to 
identify corporate governance and disclosure practices. They find that firms with better 
investment opportunities, concentrated ownership, and greater need for external financing 
practice, better governance, and that these firms are consequently valued higher. These 
attributes are stronger in countries with weaker legal systems. Klapper and Love (2003) find 
similar results in their study of firm-level corporate governance practices across emerging 
market countries. The authors find that better corporate governance is associated with higher 
operating performance, with higher Tobin’s-Q, and with higher valuations. They also find 
that firm-level corporate governance provisions matter more in countries with weak legal 
environments. Analyzing the determinants of effective legal institutions and their impact on 
economic development, Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003) analyze the “transplant effect” 
(the impact of legal systems transplanted from other, more advanced countries) for 49 
countries. The authors find that while the transplant effect has no direct impact on economic 
development, it has a strong, indirect effect via legality (e.g. enforcement). They suggest that 
the strong path dependence between economic development, legality, and the transplant 
effect explains why legal assistance that is primarily focused on improving law on the books 
has little impact on economic development. 
However, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that factors such as legal origin or culture 
do not provide a complete explanation for cross-country differences in financial development. 
In fact, they document a reversal in financial markets from 1913 to 1980 which is 
inconsistent with pure structural theories of financial development. They suggest an “interest 
group” theory where incumbents are opposed to financial development because it allows 
competition. Thus, political forces that are favorable (or unfavorable) to financial 
development are major factors in determining the development of the banking system. They 
contend that while many developing countries need institutions, including financial 
institutions, it may simply be that special interests in the countries are not allowing these 
institutions to develop. The issue of the development of a viable system of intermediation in 
the transitional economies raises interesting policy issues. For example, Meltzer (1999) 
argues that because Russia lacks the rule of law, private property, and a solvent banking 
system, IMF loans to Russia to promote piecemeal reforms are a waste of money. 
Furthermore, he points out that financial crises in Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Russia all occurred in part because these countries lack a sound banking system. 
Cook (1997a, 1997b) reports a low level of intermediation and small business lending 
in Russia, a conclusion which is consistent with previous research.
8
 Similar results have been 
reported for Poland (Feakins, 1997), the Czech Republic (Mladek, 1997), Hungary (Vajda, 
1997), and in general for the 29 transitional economies by Murrell (1996). Most of these 
studies report that the primary source of working capital for small firms is retained earnings 
and that inadequate finance is a major constraint on growth. Calvo and Coricelli (1993) 
suggest that the output collapse in Eastern Europe during the transition resulted, at least in 
part, from a credit crunch affecting aggregate supply. The problem is partly a legacy of the 
former centrally planned economies where, as Calvo and Coricelli (1993) report, banks had 
no incentive to collect firm-specific information about borrowers. A history of government 
                                                          
8 See Cook (1997b), p. 1, 8–9. Boyco, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) report that, for all practical purposes, Russian 
companies have no access to external finance and sell at about 100 times less than Western companies with  
comparable assets. See also La Porta et al. (1997), p. 1131. 
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bailouts also creates moral hazard problems by removing the incentive to develop lending 
standards (Hansson, 1995). Many studies also report the lack of an effective system of bank 
supervision and regulation in these countries as an obstacle to the development of 
intermediation (e.g. Hansson, 1995; Rostowski, 1995). A special issue of the Journal of 
Banking and Finance (Hermes & Lensink, 2000) provides an extensive discussion of 
financial system development in the transitional economies, and Buch (1996) also discusses 
this issue in detail, but neither provides a comparative analysis of the level of intermediation 
in the 29 transitional economies. Murrell (1996) and Rapaczynski (1996) also call attention to 
low levels of banking activity and legal development in the transitional economies, but do not 
provide comparative intermediation data. 
This happens to the former Soviet countries, as reported in McNulty, Harper and 
Pennathur (2007), where they relatively exhibit lower levels of financial intermediation than 
developing countries, and is consistent with findings of previous studies. 
 
 
3. Islamic Law: Origin and Financial Contracts 
 
The discussion in Section 2 shows that law plays an important role in developing the finance 
field. However, the role of Islamic law seems to be left out in the current mainstream 
discussion in finance. Therefore, the aim of this section is to discuss the basic idea on the 
differences of law origin, and financial contracts in Islam that may affect the design of 
financial institutions. 
 
3.1. Origin of Islamic Law 
 
The Muslim scholars have unanimously agreed that, when examining any new subject or 
incident that has no rule or legal value, the provisions of the primary bases of Islamic Law 
must be referred to. These are the Quran and the Sunnah that includes the Prophet 
Muhammad‟s (peace be upon him) words, deeds and tacit approvals. In a case where there is 
no equivalent rule provided by these two non-arguable sources, usually Islamic scholars will 
subsequently resort to the secondary or dependent sources of law, the Ijma’ (general public 
consensus), the Qiyas (reasoning by analogy), the Maslahah mursalah or Istislah (reasoning 
by public interest), the Istihsan (preference), the 
c
Urf (customs or common practice) and Sadd 
al-dhara’i (blocking the means).9 Thus, when a jurist wants to know the status or legal rule of 
certain issue or problem, he must refer to the primary sources first, according to the order of 
the sources. Unless he could not find the legal rule or the right solution to the issue 
concerned, he may then refer to the secondary sources, whichever relevant. 
 
3.2. Financial Contracts 
 
A contract (‘aqd) is referred to an obligation which arises from a bilateral relationship 
between two parties. In this context, contract is defined as “the conjunction of an offer 
emanating from one of the two contracting parties with the acceptance of the other in the 
manner that affects the subject matter of the contract”.10 Therefore, a contract is the result of 
a mutual agreement between the parties irrespective of who initiated the offer and who 
accepted it.  
                                                          
9
 There are a few other secondary sources that scholars rarely resort to, they are, Shar
c
 man qablana (the divine 
rules of other Prophets) and Madhhab al-sahabi (words and deeds of the companions of the Prophet). 
10
 Refer to the Mejelle (Art. 103), translated by Tyser, C.R., D.G. Demetriades and Ismail Haqqi Effendi. Kuala 
Lumpur: The Other Press 
 
 
8 
 
 In addition, for a valid contract to take place in Shari’a, certain conditions are to be 
met. The majority scholars hold that there are three elements of a valid contract namely the 
form (sighah) which comprises of offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul); the contracting parties 
(al-‘aqidayn) and the subject matter (al-ma’qud ‘alayh) i.e. the commodities and the 
considerations (example: deposits). 
 The Muslim scholars consider that a contract is completely concluded if there is 
concurrence of offer and acceptance representing the wish of the parties to enter into a 
contract. Since a contract is a bilateral agreement, thus there must be more than one party 
who are negotiating for the contract, and they must be qualified persons possessing the legal 
capacity (ahliyyah). In addition to that, the subject matter of the contract must be defined 
properly that leave no ambiguity to the contracting parties as to the nature of the subject 
matter. Another important requirement to form a contract is the purpose of the contract. As 
such, the contract must be for good and beneficial purpose according to the Shari’a. 
Consequently, the subject matter of the contract must also be legally acceptable in the eyes of 
Shari’a. 
 There are two general financial instruments that could be applied in finance, i.e., 
investment and means of payment. Investment in the form of mudharaba is considered as a 
special form of partnership (Musharakah) that has been deployed by modern Islamic 
financial institutions to provide fund management services. In line with the Islamic principles 
of risk-sharing and profit-sharing, it is characterized by one party (rabb al-mal) entrusting his 
money to another party (mudharib) who is akin to a fund manager and who contributes to the 
arrangement by providing the necessary experience and management expertise. The 
mudharib will utilize the money in an agreed manner, and will subsequently return the 
principal and a share of the profit to the rabb al-mal, retaining a pre-agreed share of the profit 
for him. 
Some papers observe that the mudharaba contract, along with musharaka contract 
which reflects profit-loss sharing characteristic, has a very strong merit in the sense that it 
relies on the spirit of cooperation. Presley, and Sessions, (1994) have shown that the use of 
the prevalent alternative method of financier remuneration (i.e. mudharaba) will, under 
certain conditions, lead to an enhanced level of capital investment on account of the ability of 
mudharaba to act as an efficient revelation device. By applying the ideas developed in the 
Western contract literature by Holmstrom and Weiss (1985) and Meyer (1986) they show that 
a mudharaba contract between a project manager and a syndicate of investors may permit a 
more efficient revelation of any informational advantage the manager may have over the 
latter. Nienhaus (1988) emphasizes that theoretically, Islamic banks, through PLS financing, 
should provide capital to dynamic entrepreneurs who have good projects but cannot offer 
collateral, and so create new business and thus contribute to the community‟s economic 
development.  
The important principles to note are: the division of profits must be on a pre-agreed 
proportional basis; if a loss occurs then the rabb al-mal will not usually face liability beyond 
the loss of principal; and the mudharib's liability will generally be confined to the loss of his 
time and effort only. 
Mudharaba may be entered into for a single investment or on a continuing basis with 
the Islamic banks acting as a fiduciary. Mudharaba investments may be made for fixed terms 
and arranged through negotiable instruments (called investment deposit certificates or 
Mudharaba certificates) and in such situations may have characteristics akin to shares. 
The uses of financial instruments as mean of payment can be seen from the following 
definition. For example, Islamic banks act as agent (or wakeel) and hence receive fee 
payment. The common meaning of the word "payment" is "the action, or an act, of paying; 
the remuneration of a person with money or its equivalent; the giving of money, etc. The 
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word is also defined as "a sum of money (or other thing) paid; pay, wages; or price". The 
verb "to pay," from which the noun "payment" is derived, is variously defined as "to give 
what is due, as for goods received; remunerate; recompense; to give or return as for goods, or 
services; to give or offer." However, "to pay" have also been construed as meaning "to give 
money or other equivalent value for; to hand over the price of a (thing); to bear the cost of; to 
be sufficient to buy or defray the cost of". Thus, although the word payment often connoted 
an exchange of value for the provision of goods or services, or the provision of value on the 
occasion of a particular event or condition, it could also encompass bearing the cost. This 
latter meaning is perhaps the most consistent with the word's use in the context of a provision 
defining non-performing financings. 
 
 
4. Legal Right and Protection under Islamic Finance 
 
From the discussion in Section 2 and 3 shows that laws varies across countries, in part 
because of differences in legal origin. Hence, how does Islamic law provide legal right to the 
contracting parties? Or, in specific, does Islamic law provides both mudharib and rabbul-
maal protection? Do the countries (that adopt Islamic law) have other substitute, mechanism 
of corporate governance? Because, the differences in legal protections of contracting parties 
might help explain why firms are financed and owned so differently in different countries. 
Why do firms practically have no excess to external finance? Why is the ownership of firms 
so widely dispersed (by contract)? The content of legal rules in different countries may shed 
light on these corporate governance puzzles. 
 
4.1. Right and Protection 
 
The effect of contract can be seen in the rights, obligations and legal effects. These effects are 
not one and the same in all contracts, but they vary from one to another. For example, the 
effects of the contract of sale are the transfer of proprietary rights in things, obligation of the 
seller to deliver goods and establishment of his right to demand the price. The effects of rent 
are the transfer of proprietary rights in usufruct to the tenant. Thus, we find that these effects 
differ from one contract to another. 
It can be said in general that the following effects accrue from the contracts. First, the 
owner has the obligations to perform the transfer of proprietary rights in things or usufruct, 
commutative or non-commutative, such as sale, gift, rent, and borrowing. 
Second, obligation of performing a specified work regardless whether this work is the 
delivery of fungible property which is a debt which a person owes to another, such as 
contract of loan, or it is some other work, such as the work of a hiring or agent. 
Third, arising the right of security as, for example, in pledge, surety and bail, and 
transfer of debt. 
The general rule is that the above effects accrue only from the contract which fulfils the 
conditions of its constitution and validity, and with which no attribute which requires the 
Lawgiver‟s prohibition against it is associated. But some jurists maintain that some of these 
effects sometimes accrue from a void contract, and it is one with which an attribute required 
by the Lawgiver‟s prohibition is associated. 
The general principle is that these effects arise and accrue from a contract after its 
existence. But there are some contracts whose effects keep away from them till permission is 
attached to them: According to the Muslim jurists, they are called the suspended contracts or 
contracts in abeyance. 
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When these effects accrue from the contract, the general rule is that they are binding on 
both contracting parties. Neither of them can dissociate itself from it. But there are some 
contracts whose effect accrues from it when both parties grant the unilateral right of 
cancellation, or one of them does so without the consent of the other party. These are called 
permissible contracts, or contracts that are not binding. 
These effects accrue from the contract by making and taking it into consideration by the 
Lawgiver and the intention of the contracting parties has nothing to do with it. A contract, in 
the opinion of the Muslim jurists, is a cause of accrual of effects from it. The general rule is 
that accrual of effects from causes is on account of making, and act of the lawgiver; the 
intention of the contracting parties has nothing to do with that. 
Accordingly, the jurists maintain that every condition which is attached to the contract 
and deviates from its effects is invalid. They call this condition repugnant or contrary to the 
essence or nature of the contract. But the conditions that are consistent with the essence or 
nature of the contract and confirm the effects which accrue from it are permitted according to 
all jurists, because they strengthen these effects and confirm their execution such as the 
stipulation of pledge and surety. 
There is another set of conditions about which disagreement arose. These are the 
conditions which neither agree nor disagree with the essence or nature of contract, and set 
restrictions on the freedom of the contracting parties, regardless whether or not they comprise 
the benefits of the stipulating party. 
The established rule in the Shari’a is the obligation of fulfilment of contracts and 
conditions which do not make an unlawful thing lawful and a lawful thing unlawful. Allah, 
the Exalted, said: “O you, who believe, fulfil the obligations”. (5:1) The Prophet (peace be 
upon him) said: “The believers are bound by their conditions, except a condition which 
makes an unlawful thing lawful and a lawful thing unlawful”. This shows that the contract is 
the law of the contracting parties as maintained by modern law. 
The application of this rule requires that the contracting parties are bound to execute the 
obligations that accrue from the contract without having the right of modifying it or 
dissociating from it, except in cases about which specific texts of the Shari’a have occurred. 
If one of the contracting parties does not execute the obligations which the contract imposes 
on him of his own accord, the other party can compel him to execute them judicially, as the 
Lawgiver grants this contracting party the right of abstaining from executing the equivalent 
or opposite obligation or to demand the annulment of the whole contract. 
The general rule in Islamic law is, as is the case of positive law that these contracts are 
not binding on any other than their contracting parties and no one other than the parties can 
benefit from them. The fulfilment of obligations that result from the contract is not binding 
on any person other than the parties to it, as no one except them can benefit from the rights 
established by the contract. 
We shall see that there are some cases, in each of the Islamic law and positive law, in 
which the effects of the contract are traceable to the persons other than the contracting 
parties. These contracts are called general or particular discrepancy in positive law. These 
cases are considered to be an exception to the general rule of relativity of contracts with 
respect to persons. 
 As for mudharaba contract, the contracting parties are the capital provider (shahib-al-
maal) and the entrepreneur (mudharib). The principal obligation of the capital provider is to 
provide the capital needed by the entrepreneur, whereas the obligation of entrepreneur mainly 
to manage the capital in his/her business venture/project in a responsible and trustworthily 
manner so that the business he/she managed capable of creating value added (profit) that will 
be shared according to the pre-agreed ratio. The capital provider right mainly is to get the 
profit share or to born the financial loss without having any control in the management of the 
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business/project. Based on this nature mudharaba financing usually be called as trusty 
financing.  
In current development of Islamic banking practices, mudharaba contract is widely 
applied in both sides of intermediary function of Islamic banks, i.e. funding and financing 
sides. In funding side, mudharaba deposits, either in saving account or mainly in 
investment/time deposit account are the major component of bank‟s deposits. Even though 
this is quite similar with those in conventional banking system, profit-sharing nature of 
Islamic bank‟s deposit has important advantage to the financial system compared to their 
conventional counterpart.
11
 At this juncture we can compare the depositors and the 
shareholders in the Islamic banking system
12
. Both are similar in providing financial capital 
to the banks, even much higher proportion for depositors, but the rights of both capital-givers 
are quite different. Table 1 below exhibits a comparison between depositors and shareholders 
in Islamic banking. 
 
Table 1: Depositors and Shareholders Comparison in the Islamic Banking System 
 
 Depositors  Shareholders 
 
Contracts 
 
 
Mudharaba 
 
Musharaka 
 
Contribution 
 
 
Financial capital as investment 
deposits 
 
 
Financial capital as shared capital 
Rights: 
Rewards 
 
 
Voting 
 
Control  
 
 
 
Return on Deposits based on Pre-
agreed Profit Share  
 
No Voting Right 
 
No specific control right 
 
 
 
Dividends 
 
 
Voting Rights 
 
Control rights via Shareholders 
General Meeting 
 
 
Obligation 
 
 
No obligation bounded 
 
 
Oblige to add capital if deem  
necessary 
 
 
Risk 
 
Exposed to all business risk 
 
Exposed to all business risk 
 
Protection 
 
Under Deposits Insurance Scheme 
only. Need to have a kind of 
specific protection by providing 
access to the management  
 
 
Shareholder protection under the 
prevailing laws 
                                                          
11
 In term of stability of financial system, profit-sharing deposits are much better scheme to build a more sound 
and healthy financial system. See further discussion in Khan and Mirakhor (1987) 
12
 See Tohirin (2004)  
 
 
12 
 
 
The existence of mudharaba deposits, along with mudharaba and musharaka 
financings, under Islamic banking system exposes very different character from that in 
interest-based deposits. This difference actually has important implication into the financial 
system, in the sense that it drives the system to be more stable due to a balance between asset 
and liability sides of the system. In addition, mudharaba deposits in fact may be treated as 
“equity capital” similar to shareholders funds. Based on these reasoning, it is therefore 
important to consider specific institutional protection mechanism for mudharaba depositors, 
especially if the system allows Islamic banks to co-exist side by side with conventional 
banks. 
As for mudharaba financing from the banks‟ viewpoint it is also important to provide 
specific enforceable regulation mechanism as a truth revealing devices for the financed 
parties to avoid any miss-reporting of their business ventures. In this regard Gonzales de-Lara 
(2001) recorded the experience of the Late Medieval Venice that the existence of state 
enforcer of contract had been effectively used for risk-sharing contract by Venetian 
merchants. It had driven the shift of contractual agreement from the sea-loan contracts 
(which is debt-based) to the commenda contracts (which is profit-loss-sharing based). 
Applying this spirit into current practices of Islamic banking and finance might drive the 
implementation of profit-loss sharing financing more significantly.  
 
4.2. Mechanism of Corporate Governance 
 
There are several interesting features in Islamic finance such as equity participation; and risk 
and profit-loss sharing arrangements. On the one side, an Islamic bank is essentially a partner 
with its depositors, and also a partner with entrepreneurs, on the other side, when employing 
depositors' funds in productive direct investment. The depositors also share in the profits 
according to predetermined ratio, and are rewarded with profit returns for assuming risk. 
These financial arrangements imply quite different stockholder relationships, and by 
corollary governance structures, from the conventional model since depositors have a direct 
financial stake in the bank's investment and equity participations. As discussed above, the 
Islamic bank is subject to an additional layer of governance since the suitability of its 
investment and financing must be in strict conformity with Islamic law and the expectations 
of the Muslim community. For this purpose, Islamic banks form the Shari’a Advisory 
Council. 
Therefore, the governance structures are quite different because the Islamic banking 
institution must obey a different set of rules - those of the Holy Qur'an - and meet the 
expectations of Muslim community by providing Islamically-acceptable financing modes. 
There are two major differences from the conventional framework. First, and foremost, an 
Islamic banking organization must serve God. It must develop a distinctive corporate culture, 
the main purpose of which is to create a collective morality and spirituality which, when 
combined with the production of goods and services, sustains the growth and advancement of 
the Islamic way of life. 
Second, Islamic banks are based on the Islamic legal concepts of shirka (partnership) 
and mudharaba (profit-sharing). An Islamic bank is conceived as financial intermediary 
mobilizing savings from the public on a mudharaba basis and advancing capital to 
entrepreneurs on the same basis. 
The profit-and-loss sharing arrangement operates under the following rules: 
 The Islamic bank receives funds from the public on the basis of unrestricted 
mudharaba. There are no restrictions imposed on the Islamic bank concerning the kind 
of activity, duration, and location of the enterprise, but the funds cannot be applied to 
 
 
13 
 
activities which are forbidden by Islam. In this regard it is necessary to provide some 
kind of protection to the depositors, which provides similar financial capital to the bank 
as the shareholders but in much higher proportion, beyond the deposit insurance 
mechanism because the profit-loss sharing nature of the deposits provide risk-absorbing 
mechanism by balancing the asset side with the liability side to create a more stable 
banking system. 
 The Islamic bank has the right to aggregate and pool the profit from different 
investments, and share the net profit (after deducting administrative costs, capital 
depreciation and Islamic tax) with depositors according to a specified formula. In the 
event of losses, the depositors lose a proportional share or the entire amount of their 
funds. The return to the financier has to be strictly maintained as a share of profits.  
 The Islamic bank applies the restricted form of mudharaba when funds are provided to 
entrepreneurs. The Islamic bank has the right to determine the kind of activities, the 
duration, and location of the projects and monitor the investments. However, these 
restrictions may not be formulated in a way which harms the performance of the 
entrepreneur, and the Islamic bank cannot interfere with the management of the 
investment. Loan covenants and other such constraints usual in conventional 
commercial bank lending are allowed.  
 The Islamic bank cannot require any guarantee such as security and collateral from the 
entrepreneur in order to insure its capital against the possibility of an eventual loss. This 
very fact implies that a different mechanism need to be reconstructed to provide a 
smooth mechanism of risk mitigation, such as enforcement mechanism to guarantee 
transparency to prevail that any miss-reporting of activities can be avoided.  
 The liability of the financier is limited to the capital provided. On the other hand, the 
liability of the entrepreneur is also restricted, but in this case solely to labor and effort 
employed. Nevertheless, if negligence or mismanagement can be proven, the 
entrepreneur may be liable for the financial loss and be obliged to remunerate financier 
accordingly.  
 The entrepreneur shares the profit with Islamic bank according to previously agreed 
division. Until the investment yields a profit, the Islamic bank is able to pay a salary to 
the entrepreneur based on the ruling market salary.  
 
Many of the same restrictions apply to musharaka financing, except that in this instance the 
losses are borne proportionately to the capital amounts contributed. Thus under these two 
Islamic modes of financing, the project is managed by the client and not by the Islamic bank, 
even though the Islamic bank shares the risk. Certain major decisions such as changes in the 
existing lines of business and the disposition of profits may be subject to the Islamic bank's 
consent. The Islamic bank, as a partner, has the right to full access to the books and records, 
and can exercise monitoring and follow-up supervision. Nevertheless, the directors and 
management of the company retain independence in conducting the affairs of the company. 
These conditions give the finance many of the characteristics of non-voting equity 
capital. From the viewpoint of the entrepreneur, there are no fixed annual payments needed to 
service the debt as under interest financing, while the financing does not increase the firm's 
risk in the way that other borrowings do through increased leverage. Conversely, from the 
bank's viewpoint, the returns come from profits - much like dividends - and the bank cannot 
take action to foreclose on the debt should profits no eventuate. 
The character of non-voting equity also attaches in the Islamic banking depositors, 
thereby it is a logical thought to provide the mechanism for depositors to have access to the 
management of the bank to which they put their financial resources. In addition, this high 
portion of the bank‟s funds can be treated as “equity-like capital” that may implicate to a 
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different sort of capital adequacy standard. Again it leads to different set of regulation to 
consider should the Islamic banking system expected to excel in showing its superiority. 
The central to such a framework is the Shari’a Advisory Council and the internal 
controls which support it. 
 
 
4.3. Shari’ah Advisory Council 
 
According to the guideline (GPS1) of Islamic banks, the latter is required to set up a Shari’a 
Advisory Council (SAC) to supervise its operations to ensure that those operations comply 
with the rules of shari’a. The SAC advises the directors on matters pertaining to the 
operational issues of the Islamic bank. The SAC also takes the views of Shari’a Committees 
of relevant authorities such as Bank Negara Malaysia and Securities Commission from time 
to time on issues relating to the industry. 
Furthermore, for an Islamic bank to be licensed under the IBA act, the bank must 
satisfy all the conditions under section 3(5) of the IBA act, namely, that the banking business 
which the bank desires to carry on will not involve any element which is not approved by the 
principle of shari’a and that there is in the articles of association of the bank provision for the 
establishment of a Shari’a Advisory Council, whose functions include advising the bank on 
the operations of its banking business in order to ensure that they do not involve any element 
which is not approved by the principles of shari’a. As regards banks under the Islamic 
banking system, Bank Negara Malaysia has issued guidelines under section 126 of BAFIA 
which authorizes these banks to offer the same products and services that is offered by the 
Islamic banks. 
Further, the guideline provides that a Shari’a Advisory Council whose members would 
be made up of Muslims religious scholars shall be established to advise the bank on the 
operation of its banking business.  The Council shall have a minimum of three and a 
maximum of seven members, whose appointments shall be acceptable to the relevant 
government minister for a term not exceeding two years, and each member is eligible for 
reappointment. 
The duties and responsibilities of SSC are to review, appraise and advise the Directors 
on the operations of the Bank‟s business in order to ensure that they do not involve any 
element, which is not approved by Islam. The roles of SSC in monitoring the Bank‟s 
activities are as follow: (i) Review the products and services to ensure conformity with 
Shari’a requirements; (ii) Deliberate on Shari’a issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation 
of the Bank and provide advice accordingly; (iii) Form opinions on the operations of the 
Bank on whether they are Shari’a compliant; and (iv) (d) Provide training and education on 
muamalah or Islamic transactions based on Shari’a principles. 
The Shari’a Advisory Council has the authority to scrutinize and approve any 
documents used by Islamic banks.  Nevertheless, although all transactions including products 
and services offered by it have to be first approved by the Council in order to ensure that they 
do not involve any element which is not approved by Islam, it is open to any interested party 
to challenge such transactions as being contrary to Islamic law as there is nothing in the IBA 
act which states that, once an operation has been approved by the bank‟s Shari’a Advisory 
Council, it may not be called into question or reviewed by any court of justice. 
In fact, the IBA act itself seems to imply that the approval of an Islamic bank‟s Shari’a 
Advisory Council of any aspect of its operations is not final and conclusive since, under 
section 11 of IBA act, the Minister of Finance may, on the recommendation of the Central 
Bank, revoke the license issued to the bank if it is pursuing aims or carrying on operations 
involving any element not approved by Islam.  It seems that the setting up of a shari’a 
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advisory body is a statutory requirement and its function is to ensure that the Islamic bank 
does not become involved in anything, which is not approved by the shari’a. 
In current development of Islamic banking practices whereby product and services need 
to be diversified and expanded, the role of SAC is not only to scrutinize the activity of the 
bank to ensure shari’a compliance but also to proactively develop and innovate new products 
and services hand-in-hand with the bank management. Therefore position of SAC becomes 
more strategic for accelerating progress of the banks. It may be no longer relevant to just put 
the SAC as a rubberstamp for shari’a compliance procedure. In this regard the argument 
whether SAC should be posed as part of the management or independently need a serious 
consideration for the sake of good corporate governance which is consistent with shari’a 
principles. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Islamic Law has been in existence for more than fourteen centuries however, it has been ups-
and-down in the implementation through historical development due to many causes.  Even 
for laws related to finance, such as profit-loss-sharing mechanism which was well-known as 
commenda, they have been there before the birth of Islamic era. Based on the Islamic 
Teachings on transactions which have a strong distinctive character of non-ribawi, Islamic 
laws and finance is believed to expose a more sound and healthy economy provided they are 
implemented properly taken into account all necessary spirit, rules, regulations, and 
institutions.  
The fact that under Islamic law on transactions there are various types of contracts, 
from contract of sales and purchases, contract of usufructs such as leasing, contract of 
sharecropping, partnerships and equity participation. Islamic banking and finance 
establishments are endowed with a precious set of law derived from the divine sources of al 
Qur’an and al hadith. It is a huge challenge to implement Islamic laws and finance as Islamic 
as possible due to its universal positive impact on the welfare of the human beings.  
Distinctive character of Islamic banking and finance relies mostly on the profit and loss 
sharing mechanism which contains the cooperative spirit needed by human beings as 
altruistic creatures. This mechanism is carried out through several types of contracts such as 
mudharaba (profit-sharing), musharaka (partnership), muzara’a (sharecropping). In addition 
there are many type of contracts of non profit and loss sharing, such as murabaha, bay’ 
bithaman ‘ajil, istisna, ijara, kafala, etc.  
This paper has been discussing that departing from cooperative spirit, the development 
of equity partnership instruments in the financial system necessitates a different set of 
regulation and institutions in order to achieve Islamic goal through economic/financial 
activities. For instance, it has been argued that application mudharaba deposits product in 
Islamic banking needs some sort of modification on the institutional aspect to allow 
depositors a limited access to the management of the bank. It is aimed at balancing the 
willingness of depositors to share the bank‟s business venture, i.e. profit and loss, and their 
role as a”quasy” shareholder due to their financial capital contribution. A model like “non-
voting” right may be considered to develop.  
Meanwhile for the application of mudharaba and musharaka in financing side of the 
bank, it has also been argued that some sort of institutional change be needed. This change 
aims at providing more enforcement to transparency of conducting business especially 
involving profit and loss sharing financing scheme. This is to prevent any deceptive practices 
such as miss-reporting from occurrence that may cost financial provider (shahibul maal) of 
unfair financial profit/loss. 
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